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Inferior temporal (IT) object representations have
been intensively studied in monkeys and humans,
but representations of the same particular objects
have never been compared between the species.
Moreover, IT’s role in categorization is not well
understood. Here, we presented monkeys and
humans with the same images of real-world objects
and measured the IT response pattern elicited by
each image. In order to relate the representations
between the species and to computational models,
we compare response-pattern dissimilarity matrices.
IT response patterns form category clusters, which
match between man and monkey. The clusters corre-
spond to animate and inanimate objects; within the
animate objects, faces and bodies form subclusters.
Within each category, IT distinguishes individual
exemplars, and the within-category exemplar simi-
larities also match between the species. Our findings
suggest that primate IT across species may host
a common code, which combines a categorical and
a continuous representation of objects.
INTRODUCTION
Do monkeys and humans see the world similarly? Do monkeys
categorize objects as humans do? What main distinctions
between objects define their cortical representation in each
species? The comparison between monkey and human brains
is important from an evolutionary perspective. High-level visual
object representations are of particular interest in this context,
because they are at the interface between perception and
cognition and have been extensively studied in each species.
Moreover, the monkey brain provides the major model system
for understanding primate and, in particular, human brain
function. Understanding the species relationship is therefore1126 Neuron 60, 1126–1141, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inca challenge central not only to comparative neuroscience but
to systems neuroscience in general.
Great progress has been made by comparing monkey and
human brains with functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI). Previous studies have used classical activation mapping
in both species and cortical-surface-based alignment to define
a spatial correspondency mapping between the species. Within
the visual system, this approach has revealed coarse-scale
regional homologies for early visual areas and object-sensitive
inferior temporal (IT) cortex (Van Essen et al., 2001; Tsao et al.,
2003; Tootell et al., 2003; Denys et al., 2004; Orban et al., 2004;
Van Essen and Dierker, 2007).
These studies employed classical activation mapping in which
activity patterns elicited by different particular stimuli within the
same class (e.g., an object category) are averaged. Moreover,
in order to increase statistical power and relate individuals and
species, spatial smoothing is typically applied to the data. As
a result, this classical approach reveals regions involved in the
processing of particular stimulus classes. It does not reveal
how those regions represent particular stimuli. In order to
address the questions posed above, however, we need to
understand how particular real-world object images are repre-
sented in fine-grained activity patterns within each region and
how their representations are related between the species.
Here, we take a first step in that direction by studying IT response
patterns elicited by the same 92 object images in monkeys and
humans.
One way to relate the IT representations between the species
would be to compare the activity patterns on the basis of a spatial
correspondency mapping between monkey and human IT.
However, this approach is bound to fail at some level of spatial
detail even within a species: every individual primate brain is
unique by nature and nurture. A neuron-to-neuron functional
correspondency cannot exist. (For proof, consider that different
individuals have different numbers of neurons.) However, even if
a fine-grained representation is unique in each individual, like
a fingerprint, the region containing the representation may be
homologous, like a finger—serving the same function in both
species. For example, the region may serve the function of.
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relating the species is additionally complicated by the fact that
activity was measured with single-cell recording in the monkeys
and fMRI in the humans. For these reasons, we do not attempt to
define a spatial correspondency mapping between monkey and
human IT. Instead, we compare each response pattern elicited
by a stimulus to each other response pattern in the same indi-
vidual animal, so as to obtain a ‘‘representational dissimilarity
matrix’’ (RDM) for each species. An RDM shows which distinc-
tions between stimuli are emphasized and which are deempha-
sized in the representation, thus encapsulating, in an intuitive
sense, the information content of the representation. Since
RDMs are indexed horizontally and vertically by the stimuli,
they can be directly compared between the species.
Our approach has the following key features. (1) The same
particular images of real-world objects are presented to both
species while measuring brain activity in IT (with electrode
recording in monkeys and high-resolution fMRI in humans). (2)
Stimuli are presented in random sequences; neither the experi-
mental design nor the analysis is biased by any predefined
grouping. (3) Each stimulus is treated as a separate condition,
for which a response pattern is estimated without spatial
smoothing or averaging (Kriegeskorte et al., 2007; Eger et al.,
2008; Kay et al., 2008). (4) The analysis targets the information
in distributed response patterns (Haxby et al., 2001; Cox and
Savoy, 2003; Carlson et al., 2003; Kamitani and Tong, 2005;
Kriegeskorte et al., 2006). (5) In order to compare the IT repre-
sentations between the species and to computational models,
we use the method of ‘‘representational similarity analysis’’
(Kriegeskorte et al., 2008), in which RDMs are visualized and
quantitatively compared.
Population representations of the same stimuli have not
previously been compared between monkey and human.
However, our approach is deeply rooted in the similarity analyses
of mathematical psychology (Shepard and Chipman, 1970). An
introduction is provided by Edelman (1998), who pioneered the
application of similarity analysis to fMRI activity patterns (Edel-
man et al., 1998) using the technique of multidimensional scaling
(Torgerson, 1958; Kruskal and Wish, 1978; Shepard, 1980).
Several studies have applied similarity analyses to brain activity
patterns and computational models (Laakso and Cottrell, 2000;
Op de Beeck et al., 2001; Haxby et al., 2001; Hanson et al.,
2004; Kayaert et al., 2005; O’Toole et al., 2005; Aguirre, 2007;
Lehky and Sereno, 2007; Kiani et al., 2007; Kay et al., 2008).
Beyond the species comparison, our approach allows us to
address the question of categoricality. IT is thought to contain
a population code of features for the representation of natural
images of objects (e.g., Desimone et al., 1984; Tanaka, 1996;
Grill-Spector et al., 2001; Haxby et al., 2001). Does IT simply
represent the visual appearance of objects? Or are the IT
features designed to distinguish categories defined independent
of the visual appearance of their members?
Whether IT is optimized for the discrimination of object cate-
gories is unresolved. Human neuroimaging has investigated
category-average responses for predefined conventional object
categories (Puce et al., 1995;Martin et al., 1996; Kanwisher et al.,
1997; Aguirre et al., 1998; Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998; Haxby
et al., 2001; Downing et al., 2001; Cox and Savoy, 2003; CarlsonNet al., 2003; Downing et al., 2006, but see Edelman et al., 1998).
This approach requires the assumption of a particular category
structure and therefore cannot address whether the representa-
tion is inherently categorical. Monkey studies have reported IT
responses that are correlated with categories (Vogels, 1999;
Sigala and Logothetis, 2002; Baker et al., 2002; Tsao et al.,
2003; Freedman et al., 2003; Kiani et al., 2005; Hung et al.,
2005; Tsao et al., 2006; Afraz et al., 2006). However, more clearly
categorical responses have been found in other regions (Kreiman
et al., 2000; Freedman et al., 2001;Quiroga et al., 2005; Freedman
and Assad, 2006), suggesting that IT has a lesser role in catego-
rization (Freedman et al., 2003). A brief summary of the previous
evidence on IT categoricality is given in the Supplemental Data.
Kiani et al. (2007) investigated monkey-IT response patterns
elicited by over 1000 images of real-world objects to address
whether IT is inherently categorical. The present study uses the
same monkey data and a subset of the stimuli to compare the
species. Cluster analysis of the monkey data revealed a detailed
hierarchy of natural categories inherent to the monkey-IT repre-
sentation. Will human-IT show a similar categorical structure?
Our approach allows us to address the question of categoricality
without the bias of predefined categories. Independent of the
result, this provides a crucial piece of evidence for current
theory. The question of the inherent category structure of IT is
of particular interest with respect to the species comparison,
because the prevalent categorical distinctions might be
expected to differ between species.
Our goal is to investigate to what extent monkey and human-IT
represent the same object information. In particular, we ask the
following. (1) Do human-IT response patterns form category
clusters as reported for monkey IT (Kiani et al., 2007)? If so,
what is the categorical structure and does it match between
species? (2) Is within-category exemplar information present in
IT? If so, is this continuous information consistent between the
species? (3) How is the representation of the objects trans-
formed between early visual cortex and IT? (4) What computa-
tional models can account for the IT representation?
RESULTS
We presented the same 92 images of isolated real-world objects
(Figure S1) tomonkeys and humanswhilemeasuring IT response
patterns with single-cell recording and high-resolution fMRI,
respectively. Two monkeys were presented with the 92 images
in rapid succession (stimulus duration, 105 ms; interstimulus
interval, 0 ms) as part of a larger set while they performed a fixa-
tion task. Neuronal activity was recorded extracellularly with
tungsten electrodes, one cell at a time. The cells were located
in anterior IT cortex, in the right hemisphere in monkey 1 and in
the left in monkey 2. The analyses are based on all cells that
could be isolated and for which sufficient data were available
across the stimuli. This yielded a total of 674 neurons for both
monkeys combined. For each stimulus, each neuron’s response
amplitude was estimated as the average spike rate within
a 140 ms window starting 71 ms after stimulus onset (for details
on this experiment, see Kiani et al., 2007).
Four humans were presented with the same images (stimulus
duration, 300 ms; interstimulus interval, 3700 ms) while theyeuron 60, 1126–1141, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 1127
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Matching Object Representations in Man and MonkeyFigure 1. Representational Dissimilarity Matrices for Monkey and Human IT
For each pair of stimuli, each RDM (monkey, human) color codes the dissimilarity of the two response patterns elicited by the stimuli in IT. The dissimilarity
measure is 1  r (Pearson correlation across space). The color code reflects percentiles (see color bar) computed separately for each RDM (for 1  r values
and their histograms, see Figure 3A). The two RDMs are the product of completely separate experiments and analysis pipelines (data not selected to match).
Human data are from 316 bilateral inferior temporal voxels (1.953 1.953 2mm3) with the greatest visual-object response in an independent data set. For control
analyses using different definitions of the IT region of interest (size, laterality, exclusion of category-sensitive regions), see Figures S9–S11. RDMs were averaged
across two sessions for each of four subjects. Monkey data are from 674 IT single cells isolated in twomonkeys (left IT in onemonkey, right in the other; Kiani et al.,
2007).performed a fixation task in a rapid event-related fMRI experi-
ment. Each stimulus was presented once in each run in random
order and repeated across runs within a given session. The
amplitudes of the overlapping single-image responseswere esti-
mated by fitting a linear model. The task required discrimination
of fixation-cross color changes occurring during image presen-
tation. We measured brain activity with high-resolution blood-
oxygen-level-dependent fMRI (3-Tesla, voxels: 1.95 3 1.95 3
2 mm3, SENSE acquisition; Pru¨ssmann, 2004; Kriegeskorte
and Bandettini, 2007; Bodurka et al., 2007) within a 5 cm thick
slab including all of inferior temporal and early visual cortex
bilaterally. Voxels within an anatomically defined IT-cortex
mask were selected according to their visual responsiveness
to the images in an independent set of experimental runs.
Representational Dissimilarity Matrices: The Same
Categorical Structure May Be Inherent to IT in Both
Species
What stimulus distinctions are emphasized by IT in each
species? Figure 1 shows the RDMs for monkey and human IT.
Each cell of a given RDM compares the response patterns
elicited by two stimuli. The dissimilarity between two response
patterns is measured by correlation distance, i.e., 1 r (Pearson
correlation), where the correlation is computed across the
population of neurons or voxels (Haxby et al., 2001; Kiani et al.,1128 Neuron 60, 1126–1141, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc2007). An RDM is symmetric about a diagonal of zeros here,
because we use a single set of response-pattern estimates.
The RDMs allow us to compare the representations between
the species, although there may not be a precise correspon-
dency of the representational features between monkey IT and
human IT and although we used radically different measurement
modalities (single-cell recordings and fMRI) in the two species.
Our approach of representational similarity analysis requires
comparisons only between response patterns within the same
individual animal, obviating the need for a monkey-to-human
correspondency mapping within IT.
Several important results (to be quantified in subsequent anal-
yses) are apparent by visual inspection of the RDMs (Figure 1).
First, there is a striking match between the RDMs of monkey
and human IT. Two stimuli tend to be dissimilar in the human-
IT representation to the extent that they are dissimilar in the
monkey-IT representation, and vice versa. This is unexpected
because the behaviorally relevant stimulus distinctions might
be very different between the species. Moreover, single-cell
recording and fMRI sample brain activity in fundamentally
different ways, and it is not well understood to what extent
they similarly reflect distributed representations. Second, the
dissimilarity tends to be large when one of the depicted objects
is animate and the other inanimate and smaller when the objects
are either both animate or both inanimate. Third, dissimilarities.
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animal faces). These observations suggest that the IT represen-
tation reflects conventional category boundaries in the same
way in both species and that there may be a hierarchical struc-
ture inherent to the representation. The categorical structure of
the matching dissimilarity patterns raises the question, whether
the fine-scale patterns of dissimilarities within the categories
also match between the species. Alternatively, the categorical
structure may fully account for the apparent match. These ques-
tions cannot be decided by visual inspection and are addressed
by quantitative analysis of the RDMs in the subsequent figures.
It is important to note that the two RDMs (Figure 1) which form
the basis of the subsequent interspecies analyses (Figure 2–4)
are the product of completely independent experiments and
analysis pipelines. In particular, voxels and cells were not
selected to maximize the match in any way.
The human RDMs are averages of RDMs computed sepa-
rately for each of two fMRI sessions in each of four subjects.
Note that averaging RDMs for corresponding functional regions
is a useful way of combining the data across subjects. As for the
species comparison, a precise intraregional spatial correspon-
dencymapping between human subjects is not required. In total,
7 hr, 24 min, and 16 s of fMRI data were used for these analyses.
For Figures 1–6, 316 inferior temporal voxels (1.95 3 1.95 3 2
mm3) with the greatest visual response were selected bilaterally
in each subject and session.
Multidimensional Scaling: Category Determines
Global Grouping when Stimuli Are Arranged
by Representational Similarity
Figure 2A shows unsupervised arrangements of the stimuli
reflecting the response-pattern similarity for monkey and human
IT (multidimensional scaling, criterion: metric stress; Torgerson,
1958;Shepard, 1980; Edelmanet al., 1998). In eacharrangement,
stimuli placed close together elicited similar response patterns;
stimuli placed far apart elicited dissimilar response patterns.
The arrangement is unsupervised in that it does not presuppose
a categorical structure. For ease of visual comparison, the two
arrangements havebeen scaled toequal size (matching the areas
of their convex hulls) and rigidly aligned (Procrustes alignment).
Stimulus arrangements computed by multidimensional scaling
are data driven and serve an important exploratory function:
they can reveal the properties that dominate the representation
of our stimuli in the population code without any prior hypoth-
eses. For IT in both species, the global grouping reflects the cate-
gorical distinctions between animates and inanimates, and
between faces and bodies among the animates. This suggests
that category is the dominant factor determining the IT response
pattern in both species: if any other stimulus property were more
important, it would dominate the stimulus arrangement.
Note also that neighboring stimuli within a category often differ
markedly in both shape and color. The arrangements are very
similar between the species. Both are characterized by a clean
separation of animate and inanimate objects. Furthermore,
body parts and faces occupy separate regions among the
animate objects.
Note that faces appear to form a particularly tight cluster in the
IT response-pattern space of both species. For the human faceNeimages this could reflect their similarity in shape and color.
However, the face cluster also includes animal faces. Although
human and animal faces may be somewhat separated within
the face cluster (see also Figure 4), very visually dissimilar animal
faces appear to group together. These and other hypotheses
inspired by exploring the stimulus arrangement will need to be
tested in separate experiments.
Interspecies Dissimilarity Correlation (1): Most Single
Stimuli Are Consistently Represented in Both Species
Inspecting the stimulus arrangements for monkey and human
separately reveals their overall similarity. However, from the
arrangements alone it is not easy to see to what extent particular
stimuli within a category appear in different ‘‘neighborhoods’’ of
the representational space in the two species. The ‘‘fiber-flow’’
visualization of Figure 2B reproduces both stimulus arrange-
ments and relates them by ‘‘fibers’’ linking dots that represent
the same stimulus. This makes it easier to see how stimuli within
the same category match up between species. Most fibers flow
in a roughly straight line (i.e., without much displacement) from
the monkey to the human representation. This reflects the
within-category match of the representations, which is analyzed
and tested for significance in Figure 3.
In order to reveal the species differences, we chose the thick-
ness of the fibers in Figure 2B to reflect the extent to which each
stimulus is inconsistently represented in monkey and human IT.
For each stimulus i, its place in the high-dimensional monkey-IT
response-pattern space is characterized by the vector mi of its
dissimilarities to the other 91 stimuli. Its place in the human-IT
representation is characterized analogously by dissimilarity
vector hi. The interspecies correlation ri (Pearson) between mi
and hi reflects the consistency of placement of the stimulus in
the representations of both species (see Figure S2 for details).
For each stimulus i, the thickness of its fiber in Figure 2B is
proportional to (1  ri)2, thus emphasizing the most inconsis-
tently represented stimuli. The prevalence of thin fibers (which
tend to be straight) reflects the overall interspecies consistency.
The single-stimulus interspecies dissimilarity correlations ri are
further visualized and statistically analyzed in Figures S2 and S3.
Results show significant interspecies consistency for about two-
thirds of the single stimuli (p < 0.05, corrected for multiple tests).
Furthermore human faces exhibit significantly higher interspe-
cies correlations than the stimulus set as a whole, and several
stimuli (including images of animate and inanimate objects)
exhibit significantly lower interspecies correlations. The two
stimuli with the lowest interspecies correlations (eggplant, back-
view of human head) were the only two stimuli described as
ambiguous by human subjects during debriefing (Figure S1).
This is consistent with the idea that the IT representation reflects
not only the visual appearance, but also the conceptual interpre-
tation of a stimulus.
Interspecies Dissimilarity Correlation (2): IT Emphasizes
the Same Stimulus Distinctions in Both Species within
and between Categories
The RDMs of Figure 1 suggest similar representations in monkey
and human IT. Figure 3A quantifies this impression. The scatter
plot of the monkey-IT dissimilarities (horizontal axis) and theuron 60, 1126–1141, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 1129
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Matching Object Representations in Man and MonkeyFigure 2. Stimulus Arrangements Reflecting IT Response-Pattern Similarity in Monkey and Human and the Interspecies Relationship
(A) The experimental stimuli have been arranged such that their pairwise distances approximately reflect response-pattern similarity (multidimensional scaling,
dissimilarity: 1  Pearson r, criterion: metric stress). In each arrangement, images placed close together elicited similar response patterns. Images placed far
apart elicited dissimilar response patterns. The arrangement is unsupervised: it does not presuppose any categorical structure. The two arrangements
have been scaled to match the areas of their convex hulls and rigidly aligned for easier comparison (Procrustes alignment). The correlations between the1130 Neuron 60, 1126–1141, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.
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Matching Object Representations in Man and Monkeyhuman-IT dissimilarities (vertical axis) across pairs of stimuli
reveals a substantial correlation (r = 0.49, p < 0.0001 estimated
by means of 10,000 randomizations of the stimulus labels).
Does the matching categorical structure fully explain the
interspecies correlation of dissimilarities? Figure 3A (colored
subsets) shows that the correlation is substantial also within
animates (r = 0.51, p < 0.0001) and, to a lesser extent, within inan-
imates (r = 0.20, p < 0.0001), as well as across pairs of stimuli
crossing the animate-inanimate boundary (r = 0.19, p < 0.0001).
The monkey-to-human correlation is also present (Figure 3B)
within images of humans (r = 0.66, p < 0.0001), within images of
nonhuman animals (r = 0.35, p < 0.0001), within images of faces
(including human and animal faces, r = 0.31, p < 0.0058), within
images of bodies (including human and animal bodies, r = 0.31,
p<0.0001; not shown in Figure 3),within imagesof humanbodies
(r = 0.53, p < 0.0001; not shown in Figure 3), within images of
natural objects (r =0.19, p<0.0039), andwithin imagesof artificial
objects (r = 0.23, p < 0.0139). These within-category dissimilarity
correlations between the species indicate that the continuous
variation of response patterns within each category cluster is
not noise, but distinguishes exemplars within each category in
a way that is consistent between monkey and human.
We did not find a significant monkey-to-human dissimilarity
correlation either within images of human faces (r = 0.05,
p < 0.605) or within images of animal faces (r = 0.12, p < 0.234;
Figure 3B, bottom left). We also did not find a significant correla-
tion within images of nonhuman bodies (r = 0.12, p < 0.21; not
shown in Figure 3).
The negative findings all occurred for small subsets of images
(12 images, 66 pairs) for which we have reduced power. Note,
however, that the effect sizes (r) were also smaller for the insignif-
icant correlations than for all significant correlations. That the
correlation is significant within human bodies, but not within
nonhuman bodies, could reflect the fact that the human-body
images included whole bodies as well as body parts, whereas
the nonhuman body images were all of whole bodies and 9 of
the 12 images were of four-limbed animals (Figure S1), which
mayconstituteaseparatesubordinatecategory (Kiani etal., 2007).
Regarding the absence of a significant interspecies dissimi-
larity correlation within human faces andwithin nonhuman faces,
one interpretation of particular interest is that human and
monkey differ in how they represent individual human faces as
well as individual nonhuman faces. For example, within each
species the representation of images of its own members may
have a special status.
Species-Specific Face Analysis: IT Might Better
Distinguish Conspecific Faces in Each Species
We observed greater dissimilarities in the human representation
of human faces than in the monkey representation of humanNfaces (Figure S8). Figure S4 explores the possibility of
a species-specific face representation. We selectively analyzed
the representation of monkey, ape, and human faces in monkey
and human IT. The dissimilarities among human faces are signif-
icantly larger in human IT than in monkey IT (p = 0.009). The
dissimilarities among monkey-and-ape faces are larger in
monkey IT than in human IT in our data, but the effect is not
significant (p = 0.12). The difference between the two effects is
significant (p = 0.02). This analysis provides an interesting lead
for future studies designed to address species-specific face
representation (for details, see Figure S4).
Hierarchical Clustering: A Nested Categorical Structure
Matching between Species Is Inherent to IT
The stimulus arrangements of Figure 2 suggest that the cate-
gories correspond to contiguous regions in IT response-pattern
space. However, it is not apparent from Figure 2 whether the
response patterns form clusters corresponding to the cate-
gories. Contiguous category regions in response-pattern space
could exist for a unimodal response-pattern distribution.
Category clusters would imply separate modes in response-
pattern space, separated by boundaries of lower probability
density. We therefore ask whether the category boundaries
can be determined without knowledge of the category labels.
Figure 4 shows hierarchical cluster trees computed for the IT
response patterns in monkey and human. Unlike the unsuper-
vised stimulus arrangements (Figure 2), hierarchical cluster
analysis (Johnson, 1967) assumes the existence of some cate-
gorical structure, but it does not assume any particular grouping
into categories.
We find very similar cluster trees for both species. The top-
level distinction is that between animate and inanimate objects.
Faces and body parts form subclusters within the animate
objects. Note that the clustering conforms closely, though not
perfectly, to the these human-conventional categories. The devi-
ating placements could be a consequence of inaccurate
response-pattern estimation: because of the large number of
conditions (92) in these experiments, our response-pattern
estimates are noisier than they would be for a small number of
conditions based on the same amount of data.
Results Similar between Hemispheres and Robust
to Exclusion of Category-Sensitive Regions
and to Varying the Number of Voxels
The results we describe for bilateral IT are similar when IT is
restricted to either cortical hemisphere (for details, see
Figure S9). Results are also robust to changes of the number
of voxels selected. The categorical structure is present already
at 100 voxels and decays only when thousands of voxels are
selected (for details, see Figure S10). Finally, the categoricalhigh-dimensional response-pattern dissimilarities (1  r) and the two-dimensional Euclidean distances in the figure are 0.67 (Pearson) and 0.69 (Spearman) for
monkey IT and 0.78 (Pearson) and 0.78 (Spearman) for human IT.
(B) Fiber-flow visualization emphasizing the interspecies differences. This visualization combines all the information from (A) and links each pair of dots represent-
ing a stimulus in monkey and human IT by a ‘‘fiber.’’ The thickness of each fiber reflects to what extent the corresponding stimulus is inconsistently represented in
monkey and human IT. The interspecies consistency ri of stimulus i is defined as the Pearson correlation between vectors of its 91 dissimilarities to the other
stimuli in monkey and human IT. The thickness of the fiber for stimulus i is proportional to (1 ri)2, thus emphasizing the most inconsistently represented stimuli.
The analysis of single-stimulus interspecies consistency is pursued further in Figures S2 and S3.euron 60, 1126–1141, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 1131
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Matching Object Representations in Man and MonkeyFigure 3. Correlation of Representational Dissimilarities between Monkey and Human IT
(A) For each pair of stimuli, a dot is placed according to the IT response-pattern dissimilarity in monkey (horizontal axis) and human (vertical axis). As before,
the dissimilarity between the two response patterns elicited by each stimulus pair is measured as 1  r (Pearson correlation). Dot colors correspond to all pairs
of stimuli (gray), pairs within the animate objects (green), pairs within the inanimate objects (cyan), and pairs crossing the animate-inanimate boundary (red).
Marginal histograms of dissimilarities are shown for the three subsets of pairs using the same color code. For detailed exploratory analysis of the species
differences, Figures S13 and S14 show the stimulus pairs corresponding to the dots for the three apical regions of the scatter plot.
(B) The same analysis as in (A), but for within-category correlations between human and monkey-IT object dissimilarities. Colored dots correspond to all pairs of
stimuli (gray) or pairs within stimulus-category subsets (colors). In the top row, each panel shows the whole set (gray), a subset (pink), and a subset nested within
that subset (red), as indicated in the colored legend of each panel. In the bottom row, each panel shows thewhole set (gray) and two disjointed subsets (green and
cyan), as indicated in the colored legend of each panel.1132 Neuron 60, 1126–1141, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.
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(Kanwisher et al., 1997) and the parahippocampal place area
(PPA) (Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998) are bilaterally excluded
from the selected voxel set (for details, see Figure S11). After
exclusion of FFA and PPA, the region of interest has most of
its voxels in the lateral occipital complex, but also includes
more anterior object-sensitive voxels within IT.
Category-Boundary Effect: Weak in Early Visual Cortex
and Strong in IT
The human fMRI data allowed us to compare the representations
between early visual cortex and IT (Figures 5, 6, and S5). Visual
inspection of the RDMs (Figure 5) suggests a categorical repre-
sentation in IT, but not in early visual cortex. The multidimen-
sional scaling arrangements and hierarchical cluster trees also
In both (A) and (B), each panel’s color legend (top inset) also states the correlations (r, Pearson) between monkey and human-IT dissimilarities and their
significance (*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001). The dissimilarity correlations are tested by randomization of the stimulus labels. This test correctly handles
the dependency structure within each RDM. All p values < 0.0001 are stated as p < 0.0001 because the randomization test terminates after 10,000 iterations.
Figure 4. Hierarchical Clustering of IT Response Patterns
In order to assess whether IT response patterns form clusters corresponding to natural categories, we performed hierarchical cluster analysis for human (top) and
monkey (bottom). This analysis proceeds from single-image clusters (bottom of each panel) and successively combines the two clusters closest to each other in
terms of the average response-pattern dissimilarity, so as to form a hierarchy of clusters (tree structure in each panel). The vertical height of each horizontal link
indicates the average response-pattern dissimilarity (the clustering criterion) between the stimuli of the two linked subclusters (dissimilarity: 1  r). The cluster
trees for monkey and human are the result of completely independent experiments and analysis pipelines. This data-driven technique reveals natural-category
clusters that are consistent between monkey and human. For easier comparison, we colored subcluster trees (faces, red; bodies, magenta; inanimate objects,
light blue). Early visual cortex (Figures 5, 6, and S5) and low-level computational models (Figures S6 and S7) did not reveal such category clusters.Neuron 60, 1126–1141, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 1133
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Matching Object Representations in Man and MonkeyFigure 5. Early Visual Cortex and IT in the Human: Representational Dissimilarity Matrices and Category-Boundary Effects
(A) RDMs for human IT (top left, same as in Figure 1) and human early visual cortex (top right). As in Figure 1, the color code reflects percentiles (see color bar)
computed separately for each RDM (for 1 r values and their histograms, see Figure 6). The bar graph below each RDM shows the average dissimilarity (percen-
tile of 1  r) within the animates (green bars), within the inanimates (cyan bars), and for pairs crossing the category boundary (red bars). Error bars indicate the
standard error of the mean estimated by bootstrap resampling of the stimulus set. We define the category-boundary effect as the difference (in percentile points)
between the mean dissimilarity for between-animate-and-inanimate pairs and the mean dissimilarity for within-animate and within-inanimate pairs. The zeros on
the diagonal are excluded in computing these means. The category-boundary effect sizes are given above the bars in each panel with significant effects marked
by stars (pR 0.05 indicated by n.s. for ‘‘not significant,’’ *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001). The p values are from a bootstrap test; a randomization test yields the
same pattern of significant effects (see Results). Here, as in Figures 1–4, human IT has been defined at 316 voxels (for IT at 100–10,000 voxels, see Figure S10) and
human early visual cortex at 1057 voxels.
(B) The same analyses for smaller and larger definitions of human early visual cortex (224 and 5000 voxels, respectively).1134 Neuron 60, 1126–1141, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.
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categorical representation (Figure S5). Note, however, that
a subset of the human faces appears to be associated with
somewhat lower dissimilarities in early visual cortex (Figure 5).
This could be caused by similarities in shape and color among
these stimuli.
Although the early visual representation does not exhibit
a categorical structure as observed for IT, the top-level
animate-inanimate distinction might be reflected in the early
visual responses in more subtle ways. To test this possibility
for the top-level animate-inanimate distinction, we analyze the
category-boundary effect, which we define as the difference
between the mean dissimilarity for between-category pairs
(i.e., one is animate, the other inanimate) and the mean dissimi-
larity for within category pairs (i.e., both are animate or both are
inanimate). As in Figure 1, the dissimilarities are correlation
distances between spatial response patterns, converted to
percentiles for each RDM separately (for histograms of the orig-
inal correlation distances, see Figure 6). The analysis indicates
that the category-boundary effect is strong in IT and weak, but
present, in early visual cortex. The category-boundary effect
estimates in percentile points are 36% (p < 0.001) for IT (defined
at 316 voxels as before) and 7% (0.01 < p < 0.05), 5% (0.01 < p <
0.05), and 2% (not significant) for early visual cortex, defined at
224, 1057, and 5000 voxels, respectively. We further investi-
gated the category distinction by a linear decoding analysis
(Figure S12), which suggested linear separability of animates
and inanimates in IT, but not early visual cortex.
The p values for the category-boundary effect were computed
by bootstrap resampling of the stimulus set, thus simulating the
distributions of mean dissimilarities expected if the experiment
were to be repeated with different stimuli from the same
categories and with the same subjects. We also tested the cate-
gory-boundary effect by a randomization test in which the stim-
ulus labels are randomly permuted, thus simulating the null
hypothesis of no difference between the response patterns
elicited by the stimuli, but not generalizing to different stimuli
from the same categories. This test yields the same pattern of
significant results as the bootstrap test (p < 0.001 for IT and early
visual cortex defined at 224 or 1057 voxels, pR 0.05 for human
early visual cortex defined at 5000 voxels). In addition, both
bootstrap and randomization tests show a significantly larger
category-boundary effect in IT than in early visual cortex (p <
0.0001 for each of the three sizes of the early visual region of
interest).
Representational Connectivity Analysis: Early Visual
Cortex and IT Share Visual-Similarity Information
We have compared monkey and human IT by correlating repre-
sentational dissimilarities across pairs of stimuli. The same
approach can serve to characterize the relationship between
the representations in two brain regions of a given species. In
analogy to the concept of functional connectivity, we refer to
the correlation of representational dissimilarities between two
brain regions as their ‘‘representational connectivity.’’ Like
functional connectivity, representational connectivity does not
imply an anatomical connection or a directed influence.
Unlike functional connectivity, representational connectivity isNea multivariate, nonlinear, and design-dependent connectivity
measure.
Visual comparison of the RDMs for early visual cortex and
IT does not suggest a strong correlation, because the cate-
gorical structure dominating IT appears absent in early visual
cortex.
However, the representational-connectivity scatter plot
(Figure 6) reveals a substantial correlation of the dissimilarities
(r = 0.38, p < 0.0001). Pairs of stimuli eliciting more dissimilar
response patterns in early visual cortex also tend to elicit more
dissimilar response patterns in IT. The analysis for between-
and within-category subsets of pairs reveals what drives this
effect (see diagram in Figure 6B). First, the between-category
distribution (red) is shifted relative to the within-category distri-
butions, but only along the IT axis, not along the early-visual
axis. This is evident in the marginal dissimilarity histograms
framing the scatter plot (Figure 6) and reflects the category-
boundary effect, which is strong in IT and weak in early visual
cortex (Figure 5). Second, in addition to its category-boundary
effect, IT reflects the dissimilarity structure of the early visual
representation for within- as well as between-category pairs
(diagonally elongated distributions, p < 0.0001 for all correla-
tions, tested by randomization of the stimulus labels). These
results do not depend on the size of the early-visual region of
interest (Figure 6C).
Early visual response patterns are likely to reflect shape simi-
larity in this experiment, because all stimuli were presented at
the same retinal location (fovea) and size (2.9 visual angle).
Shape similarity as reflected in the early visual representation
(see also Kay et al., 2008) may therefore carry over to the IT
representation, even if IT is more tolerant to changes of position
and size.
Computational Modeling: A Range of Low-
and Intermediate-Level Representations Cannot
Account for the Categorical Structure Observed in IT
Can low-level feature similarity account for our results? We
compared the IT representation to several low-level model
representations. The low-level models included the color images
themselves (in CIELAB color space), simple processed versions
of the images (low-resolution color image, grayscale image, low-
resolution grayscale image, spatial low- and high-pass-filtered
grayscale image, binary silhouette image), CIELAB joint color
histograms, and a computational model of V1 (including simple
and complex cells). We also tested an intermediate-level compu-
tational model corresponding approximately to the level of V4
and posterior IT, the HMAX-C2 representation based on natural
image patches. (For details on these models, see Supplemental
Data.) The RDMs, multidimensional scaling arrangements, and
hierarchical cluster trees for these models (Figures S6 and S7)
suggest that none of them can account for the category clus-
tering we observed in IT cortex.
DISCUSSION
Matching Information in Monkey and Human IT
IT is thought to contain a high-level representation of visual
objects at the interface between perception and cognition.uron 60, 1126–1141, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 1135
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similar distinctions among objects. To answer the questions
posed at the end of the Introduction: (1) IT response patterns
elicited by object images appear to cluster according to the
same categorical structure in monkey and human. (2) Within
each category, primate IT appears to represent more fine-
grained object information. This information as well is remark-
ably consistent across species and may reflect subordinate
Figure 6. Representational Connectivity between Early Visual Cortex and IT in the Human
(A) For each pair of stimuli, we plot a dot with horizontal position reflecting early visual response-pattern dissimilarity and vertical position reflecting IT response-
pattern dissimilarity. Scatter plots and correlation analyses (insets) show that pairs of stimuli eliciting more dissimilar response patterns in early visual cortex
also tend to elicit more dissimilar response patterns in IT. This suggests that visual similarity as reflected in the early visual representation carries over into
the IT representation. However, IT additionally exhibits a strong category-boundary effect: when a stimulus pair crosses the animate-inanimate boundary
(red) the two response patterns tend to be more dissimilar than when both stimuli are from the same category (green, cyan). The category-boundary effect is
evident in the marginal dissimilarity histograms framing the scatter plot (for statistical analysis, see Figure 5).
(B) In this conceptual diagram, the distributions from the scatter plots are depicted as ellipsoids (iso-probability-density contours) with the same color code. The
visual-similarity effect is shared between early visual and IT representations (each distribution diagonally elongated), whereas the category-boundary effect is
only present in IT (red distribution vertically, but not horizontally shifted with respect to the within-category distributions).
(C) The same analyses for smaller and larger definitions of human early visual cortex (224 and 5000 voxels, respectively) show that the findings above do not
depend on the size of the early visual region of interest.1136 Neuron 60, 1126–1141, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.
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similarity (Op de Beeck et al., 2001; Eger et al., 2008). (3) Cat-
egoricality appears to arise in IT; it is largely absent in human
early visual cortex. (4) A range of low- and intermediate-level
computational models did not reproduce the categorical struc-
ture observed for human and monkey IT.
A Hierarchical Category Structure Inherent to IT
The categorical structure inherent to IT in both species appears
hierarchical: animate and inanimate objects form the two major
clusters; faces and bodies form subclusters within the animate
cluster. The hierarchy observed for the present set of 92 stimuli
has only two levels. However, the previous study by Kiani et al.
(2007), using over 1000 stimuli, reported a hierarchy for monkey
IT, which is consistent with our findings here, but extends into
finer distinctions. This raises the question, whether finer categor-
ical distinctions are also present in the human and, if so, if they
match between the species.
Relationship between Category-Sensitive Regions
and IT Pattern Information
Human neuropsychology has described category-specific defi-
cits resulting from temporal brain damage and suggested
a special status for the living/nonliving distinction (Martin,
2007; Capitani et al., 2003; Humphreys and Forde, 2001; Martin
et al., 1996). Our results support the view that this distinction has
a special status. We note that fruit and vegetables fall into the
inanimate category in the IT cluster structure we observed
(Figure 4). Our findings are also consistent with the idea that IT
contains specialized features or processing mechanisms for
faces and bodies (Puce et al., 1995; Kanwisher et al., 1997;
Downing et al., 2001; but see also Gauthier et al., 2000).
Can the previous findings on human-IT regions sensitive to
these categories explain the IT response-pattern clustering we
report? Let us assume that the FFA responds with a similar over-
all activation to each individual face (Kriegeskorte et al., 2007).
Including the FFA in the region of interest will then render IT
response patterns to faces more similar, thus contributing to
their clustering. More generally, a sufficiently category-sensitive
feature set will exhibit categorical clustering of the response
patterns.
However, the existence of the category-sensitive regions does
not predict (1) that the category effects will dominate the repre-
sentation such that response patterns form category clusters
that are separable without prior knowledge of the categories
(alternatively, the category-sensitive component could be too
weak—in relation to the total response-pattern variance—to
form clusters), (2) that the cluster structure will be hierarchical,
or (3) what categorical distinction is at the top of the hierarchy
(explaining most response-pattern variance). Moreover, our
human results hardly changed when FFA and PPA were
excluded (Figure S11), leaving the lateral occipital complex as
the main focus within the IT region of interest. (Voxels were
selected by their average response to objects versus fixation
using independent data.) In the monkeys, the IT recordings did
not target category-sensitive regions (Tsao et al., 2003); never-
theless, the population exhibited a complex categorical clus-
tering of its response patterns (Figure 4), and for each pair ofNecategories, discrimination by the cell population was robust to
exclusion of cells responding maximally to either category
(Figure 10 of Kiani et al., 2007).
If FFA and PPA can be excluded without a qualitative change
to the representational dissimilarity structure (Figure S11), the re-
maining portion of human IT must have similarly category-sensi-
tive features. One interpretation is that the prominent category
regions are just particularly conspicuous concentrations of
related features within a larger category-sensitive feature map
(Haxby et al., 2001). Such large, consistently localized foci of
features may only exist for a few categories (Downing et al.,
2006). Their number is limited by the available space in the brain.
Beyond discovering those regions, our larger goal should be to
understand the representation as a whole, including the
contribution of its less prevalent—or perhaps just more scat-
tered—features. After all, IT categoricality is inherently a popula-
tion phenomenon: Step-function-like categorical responses as
reported for cells in the medial temporal lobe (Kreiman et al.,
2000) and prefrontal cortex (Freedman et al., 2001) are not
typically observed in either single IT cells (Vogels, 1999;
Freedman et al., 2003; Kiani et al., 2007; but see Tsao et al.,
2006) or category-sensitive fMRI responses (Haxby et al., 2001).
Categorical clustering of response patterns indicates that the
categorical distinctions explain a lot of variance across the
population. It does not imply that any single cell exhibits
a step-function-like response.
Explaining the IT Representational Similarity Structure
Can low-level features explain the IT representational similarity
structure? The categorical cluster structure observed in IT was
absent in the fMRI response patterns in human early visual
cortex (Figures 5 and S5) and also in several low-level model
representations of the images (luminance pattern, color pattern,
color histogram, silhouette pattern, V1 model representation;
Figures S6 and S7). The possibility that our findings can be ex-
plained by low-level features can never be formally excluded,
because the space of models to be tested is infinite. However,
our results suggest that the categorical clustering in IT does
not reflect only low-level features.
Can more complex natural-image features explain the IT
representational similarity structure? Categorical clustering
was not evident in the intermediate-complexity HMAX-C2model
based on natural image fragments (Figure S7; Serre et al., 2005).
In addition, a high-level representation composed of shape-
tuned units adapted to real-world object images in the HMAX
framework has previously been shown not to exhibit categorical
clustering (Kiani et al., 2007).
Our interpretation of the current evidence is that evolution and
development leave primate IT with features optimized not only
for representing natural images (as the features of the models
described above), but also for discriminating between object
categories. This suggests that an IT model should acquire cate-
gory-discriminating features by supervised learning (Ullman,
2007). A recent study suggests that human IT responds prefer-
entially to such category-discriminating features (Lerner et al.,
2008).
Does IT categoricality arise from feedforward or feedback pro-
cessing? Our tasks (in both species) minimize the top-downuron 60, 1126–1141, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 1137
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stimuli. Although this does not abolish local recurrent process-
ing, it minimizes feedback from higher regions, suggesting that
IT categoricality is not a product of top-down influences. One
interpretation is that IT categoricality arises from feedforward
connectivity. Rapid feedforward animate-inanimate discrimina-
tion would explain reports that humans can perform animal
detection at latencies allowing for limited recurrent processing
(Thorpe et al., 1996; Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006).
Serre et al. (2007) proposed a feedforward model of rapid
categorization (see also Riesenhuber and Poggio, 2002), which
summarizes a wealth of neuroscientific findings. Their architec-
ture may be able to account for our findings. However, these
authors associate the category-discrimination stage with pre-
frontal cortex. Our results suggest that features at the stage of
IT already are optimized for category discrimination.
Beyond visual features optimized for categorization, could IT
represent more complex semantic information? So far we have
considered the features a means to the end of categorization.
Instead, we could argue, more generally, that the features serve
to infer nonvisual properties from the visual input. The features,
then, are the end, and category clusters may arise as a conse-
quence of the feature set. It has been suggested, for example,
that IT represents action-related properties (Mahon et al., 2007).
This perspective relates our findings to the literature on semantic
representations (Tyler and Moss, 2001; McClelland and Rogers,
2003; Patterson et al., 2007). In order to test semantic-feature
hypotheses along with computational models, we could predict
the IT representational similarity from semantic property descrip-
tions of the stimuli.
To find amodel that reproduces the empirical representational
similarity structure of IT (Figure 1) would constitute a substantial
theoretical advance. The reader is invited to join us in testing
additional models by exposing them to our stimuli and com-
paring the RDMs of the model representations to our empirical
RDMs from IT. If the models have parameters fitted, so as best
to predict the empirical RDMs, independent stimulus sets will
be needed for fitting and testing. We will provide both stimuli
and RDMs of monkey and human IT upon request.
Representational Similarity Analysis
Studying a brain region’s pairwise response-pattern dissimilar-
ities for a sizable set of stimuli reveals what distinctions are
emphasized and what distinctions are abstracted from by the
representation. Representational similarity analysis allows us to
make comparisons between brain regions (Figure 6), between
species (Figure 3), between measurement modalities (Figure 3,
confounded with the species-effect here), and between biolog-
ical brains and computational models (Figures S6 and S7). An
RDM usefully combines the evidence across the patterns of
response within a functional region (thus allowing us to see the
forest), but it requires no averaging of activity across space,
time, or stimuli (thus honoring the trees). The RDM has a very
intricate structure ((n2  n)/2 dissimilarities, where n is the
number of stimuli), thus providing a rich characterization of the
representation.
In order to understand a population code, representational
similarity analysis must be complemented with a wide range of1138 Neuron 60, 1126–1141, December 26, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Incmethods. For example, we need to quantify the pairwise stimulus
information, address how the representation can be read out
(e.g., is a given distinction explicit in the sense of linear decod-
ability?; Figure S12), how it relates to other brain representations
(Figure 6) and behavior, and how the activity patterns are orga-
nized in space and time.
Implications for the Relationship between fMRI
and Single-Cell Data
A single voxel in blood-oxygen-level-dependent fMRI reflects
the activity of tens of thousands of neurons (Logothetis et al.,
2001). We therefore expect to find somewhat different stimulus
information in hemodynamic and neuronal response patterns.
fMRI patterns may contain more information about fine-grained
neuronal activity patterns than voxel size would suggest
(Kamitani and Tong, 2005). But to what extent neuronal pattern
information is reflected in fMRI pattern information is not well
understood, because a voxel’s signal does not provide us simply
with the average activity within its boundaries, but rather reflects
the complex spatiotemporal transform of the hemodynamic
response. The close match we report here between the RDMs
from single-cell recording and fMRI provides some hope that
data from these two modalities, for all their differences, may
somewhat consistently reveal neuronal representations when
subjected to massively multivariate analyses of activity-pattern
information (Kriegeskorte and Bandettini, 2007).
A Common Code in Primate IT
Taken together, our results suggest that evolution and individual
development leave primate IT with representational features that
emphasize behaviorally important categorical distinctions. The
major distinctions, animate-inanimate and face-body, are so
basic that their conservation across species appears plausible.
However, the IT representation is not purely categorical. Within
category clusters, object exemplars are represented in a contin-
uous object space, which may reflect a form of visual similarity.
The categorical and continuous aspects of the representation
are both consistent between man and monkey, suggesting that
a code common across species may characterize primate IT.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
This section describes the experimental designs and brain-activity measure-
ments in monkey and human. The monkey experiments have previously
been described in detail (Kiani et al., 2007), so we only give a brief summary
here. Detailed descriptions of the statistical analysis and human localizer
experiments are in the Supplemental Data.
Stimuli Presented to Humans and Monkeys
The stimuli presented to monkeys and humans were 92 color photographs
(175 3 175 pixels) of isolated real-world objects on a gray background
(Figure S1). The objects included natural and artificial inanimate objects as
well as faces and bodies of humans and nonhuman animals. No predefined
stimulus grouping was implied in either the experimental design or the core
analyses for either species.
Monkey Experiments
Experimental Design and Task
Two alert monkeys were presented with the 92 images in rapid succession
(stimulus duration, 105 ms; interstimulus interval, 0 ms) as part of a larger.
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Matching Object Representations in Man and Monkeyset of over 1000 similar images while they performed a fixation task. Fixation
was monitored with an infra-red eye-tracking system. Stimuli were presented
in a pseudorandom order. The stimulus sequence started after the monkey
maintained fixation for 300 ms. Stimuli spanned a visual angle of about 7.
Each stimulus lasted for 105 ms and was followed by another stimulus without
intervening interstimulus interval.
Brain-Activity Measurements
Neuronal activity was recorded extracellularly with tungsten electrodes,
one cell at a time. The cells were located in anterior IT cortex (anterior
13–20 mm, distributed over the ventral bank of the superior temporal sulcus
and the ventral convexity up to the medial bank of the anterior middle temporal
sulcus), in the right hemisphere in monkey 1 and in the left in monkey 2. On
average, the stimulus set was repeated 9 ± 2 (median, 10) times for each
recording site. A different random stimulus sequence was used on each repe-
tition for each recording site in order to avoid consistent interactions between
successively presented stimuli.
Human Experiments
Experimental Design and Task
Wepresented the 92 images to subjects in a ‘‘quick’’ event-related fMRI exper-
iment, which balances the need for separable hemodynamic responses (sug-
gesting a slow event-related design) and the need for presenting many stimuli
in the limited time-span of the fMRI experiment (suggesting a rapid event-
related design). The experiment included four additional images, which
were excluded from the interspecies analyses because of insufficient
monkey data (Figure S1). Stimuli spanned a visual angle of 2.9 and were pre-
sented foveally for a duration of 300 ms on a constantly visible uniform gray
background. Stimuli were centered with respect to a fixation cross superim-
posed to them.
Each stimulus was presented exactly once in each run. The sequence also
included 40 null trials with no stimulus presented (4 of them at the beginning,
4 of them at the end, and 32 randomly interspersed in the sequence). The
trial-onset asynchrony was 4 s; the stimulus-onset asynchrony was either 4 s
or a multiple of that duration when null trials occurred in the sequence. The
trials (including 96 stimulus presentations and 32 interspersed null trials)
occurred in random order (no sequence optimization). We used a different
random sequence on each of up to 14 runs (spread over two fMRI sessions)
per subject. A run lasted 9min and4 s (4 +96+32+4=136 trials, each 4 s long).
Subjects continually fixated a fixation cross superimposed to the stimuli and
performed a color-discrimination task. During stimulus presentation the fixa-
tion cross turned from white to either green or blue and the subject responded
with a right-thumb button press for blue and a left-thumb button press for
green. The fixation-cross changes to blue or green were chosen according
to an independent random sequence.
Brain-Activity Measurements
Blood-oxygen-level-dependent fMRI was performed at high spatial resolution
using a 3T GE HDx MRI scanner. For signal reception, we used a receive-only
whole-brain surface-coil array (16 elements, NOVA Medical Inc., Wilmington,
MA). Twenty-five 2mmaxial slices (no gap) were acquired, covering the occip-
ital and temporal lobe, using single-shot interleaved gradient-recalled Echo
Planar Imaging (EPI) with a sensitivity-encoding sequence (SENSE, accelera-
tion factor: 2, Pru¨ssmann 2004). Imaging parameters were as follows: EPI
matrix size: 128 3 96, voxel size: 1.95 3 1.95 3 2 mm3, echo time (TE):
30 ms, repetition time (TR): 2 s. Each functional run consisted of 272 volumes
(9 min and 4 s per run). Four subjects were scanned in two separate sessions
each, resulting in 11 to 14 runs per subject, yielding a total of 49 runs (equiva-
lent to 7 hr, 24 min, and 16 s of fMRI data). As an anatomical reference, we
acquired high-resolution T1-weighted whole-brain anatomical scans with
aMagnetization Prepared Rapid Gradient Echo (MPRAGE) sequence. Imaging
parameters were as follows: matrix size: 256 3 256, voxel size: 0.863 0.86 3
1.2 mm3, 124 slices.
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